Cloud computing delivers value to users by facilitating their access to servers at any time period needed. An approach is to provide both on-demand and spot services on shared servers. The former allows users to access servers on demand at a fixed price and users occupy different time periods on servers. The latter allows users to bid for the remaining unoccupied time periods via dynamic pricing; however, without appropriate design, such time periods may be arbitrarily short since on-demand users arrive randomly. This is also the current service model adopted by Amazon Elastic Cloud Compute. In this article, we provide the first integral framework for sharing time on servers between on-demand and spot services while optimally pricing spot service. It guarantees that on-demand users can get served quickly while spot users can stably use servers for a properly long period once accepted, which is a key feature in making both on-demand and spot services accessible. Simulation results show that, by complementing the on-demand market with a spot market, a cloud provider can improve revenue by up to 461.5%. The framework is designed under assumptions that are met in real environments. It is a new tool that other cloud operators can use to quantify the advantage of a hybrid spot and on-demand service, making the case for eventually integrating this service model into their own infrastructures.
hour. Spot instances have uncertain availability and their price (termed spot price) fluctuates over time [2] . Every user can bid for spot instances; they will be granted to users only if the bid is not below the spot price. The bid is the maximum price that the spot user can accept to pay for the spot instances. Once the spot price exceeds the user's bid, its spot instances will get lost and terminated by Amazon EC2. Users will be charged according to the spot prices.
From a CSP's perspective, spot instances render available the computing capacity unused in the on-demand market and allow for a discount compared with the on-demand price. This permits increasing the CSP's gain in terms of revenue and user satisfiability. First, users with different delay requirements can be satisfied economically by the two types of instances [23, 39] . Latency-critical users can get service quickly by specifying a period in which to use instances. Delay-tolerant users can first use spot instances at lower prices but with uncertain availability; in the case that users do not get enough instances in a long period, they can turn to on-demand instances to accelerate processing their jobs. Next, the periods of servers unoccupied by on-demand users correspond to the idle states of on-demand instances. In the Amazon EC2 service, spot users can bid to use these states, i.e., spot instances. The pricing mechanism is not fully disclosed; however, the spot price is claimed to be set through a uniformly priced, sealed-bid, market-driven auction [2] : "uniform price" means that all bidders pay the same price (i.e., spot price); "sealed-bid" means that a user does not know the bids of the other users; "market-driven" means that the spot price fluctuates based on the supply and demand of available unused EC2 capacity but is updated regularly.
Related Work
Many works have focused on characterizing spot prices over time and understanding the spot pricing scheme [19, 20] ; the most relevant are [2, 34, 46] . Agmon Ben-Yehuda et al. analyze the time series of spot prices in different regions and define the availability of spot instances as a function of the bid, i.e., the probability that a user successfully gets spot instances under an arbitrary bid [2] . The authors showed that the functional curves of different types of instances in 4 regions share the same shape. Further, they conclude that spot prices in Amazon EC2 are usually drawn from a tight, fixed range of prices and are not driven by the relation of supply and demand, as claimed by Amazon EC2. The authors claim that the use of such a pricing scheme can create an impression of false activity (demand and supply changes) and mask times of low demand and price inactivity, thus possibly driving up the CSP's stock.
Wang et al. study the optimal pricing of spot instances [34] . They assume perfect knowledge of the demand curve describing the relation of demand and price at every slot t, i.e., the number N t of bids accepted and served under every possible spot price. Further, Lyapunov optimization is applied to derive the optimal price of spot instances by assuming that the total number L t of bids is kept finite at every slot t. Here, the L t bids contain both the bids that newly arrive at t and all bids that arrived at the previous slots but have not been served so far. However, the demand curve is unknown in reality [5] ; an additional complication is that the current cloud market is still rapidly growing and unstable [13] .
Zheng et al. derive the cost-optimal bid price for users to use spot instances based on an estimated distribution of the past spot prices in Amazon EC2 [46] . In particular, similar to [34] , Lyapunov optimization is used to derive the relation between the number of bid arrivals Λ t and the spot price π t at every slot t. As a result, by assuming that the bid arrivals follow a simple distribution (e.g., exponential), the more complex distribution of spot prices could be approximated analytically. Other assumptions adopted include that (i) the users' bids at every slot t follow a uniform distribution over [π , π ] ; and (ii) at the end of each slot, the proportion of the accepted bids that are finished is a constant. The first assumption enables simply deriving the expected number of the bids accepted at t, i.e., the fraction of bids whose prices are not below the spot price.
20:5
In [34, 46] , due to their assumptions, the number of bids accepted at every slot does not need to rely on the idle state of the on-demand market. However, the spot market's capacity to accept bids is supposed to be determined by such idleness. Their models cannot account for the actual preemption scheme used for sharing server time among on-demand and spot users. Furthermore, in order to apply the Lyapunov optimization technique, an underlying assumption in [34, 46] is that all bids submitted by users will be finally accepted and served. However, this is not what Amazon EC2 promises to its spot users, and it provides only best-effort services.
Abhishek et al. [1] and Dierks and Seuken [10] analyze the performance of a hybrid spot and on-demand market using queuing theory and game theory in continuous time. More recently, in [10] , the servers are separated into two parts, serving on-demand and spot jobs, respectively. Jobs of users have diverse values and sensitivities to delay. The on-demand market has a higher price but guarantees a negligible delay; in the spot market, the lower a user's bid, the larger the delay of completing its jobs. Users aim to maximize their surplus and make a choice on which type of instances to use. The authors show that offering a spot market can increase the profit of a CSP. In spite of the technical merits of [1, 10] , an issue in these works is that in the proposed schemes, the idle servers in the on-demand market cannot be sold as spot instances, whereas making use of such idle instances is one of the main attractions of the spot market [9] . Furthermore, inspired by the dynamic pricing of Amazon EC2, there are also many works that apply the auction and mechanism design theory to cloud pricing [12, 30-33, 36, 40-42, 44, 47, 48] ; the most relevant ones are [4, 16, 38] . In those frameworks, jobs truthfully report their values and latency requirements to the CSP; the CSP chooses a subset of jobs to maximize the social welfare and processes the chosen jobs on multiple machines with its capacity constraint. Unlike the model of this article, Wu and De Pellegrini [37] analyze the performance of a type of QoS-differentiated pricing in cloud computing via an analytical approach. The CSP offers multiple QoS classes: the jobs of each class will be completed with a finite waiting time. Also, the shorter the waiting time, the higher the unit price. The CSP's servers are divided into several groups, each processing the jobs of the same class. The authors give the optimal price, optimal rate of accepting jobs, and minimal number of servers needed for each QoS class, thus deriving the performance of the whole system.
MANAGING ON-DEMAND AND SPOT SERVICES
In this section, we propose a baseline model for colocating on-demand and spot jobs on servers.
The key notation is summarized in Table 1 . The model refers to several schemes to (i) assign ondemand jobs to servers where every server will dedicate a specified period to the assigned job, (ii) decide which bids to accept under an arbitrary spot price, and (iii) assign spot jobs to servers. As discussed in Section 2.1, we assume that there are m homogeneous servers.
Model for Colocating On-Demand and Spot Jobs
On-demand jobs have higher priority than spot jobs to access servers. On-demand jobs arrive randomly and spot jobs may be preempted arbitrarily. However, the resource-sharing model needs to accommodate two seemingly conflicting requirements:
(1) Immediacy of on-demand service. Upon arrival of an on-demand job, it can get served in a short time; (2) Persistence of spot service. After a spot job enters a service, it will not be preempted shortly by on-demand jobs; ideally, the colocation scheme needs to guarantee a minimum execution time for spot jobs. 
Bids of such users who bid successfully at t − 1 and continue bidding at t J t
Bids that are newly submitted in the period of
Bids in J t that are also accepted at t J t Bids in J t accepted at t k Slot contains k minutes k Time spent on loading/migrating virtual machine images (VMIs) is k minutes
All bids ofĴ t that cause the operation of migrating VMI at the beginning of t J t,2Ĵ t −Ĵ t,1 , in which each bid is assigned to the same server at t − 1 and t f t |Ĵ t ∪Ĵ t,1 |, i.e., the total number of the operations of loading/migrating VMI We first need to provide a discrete-time model able to describe the assignment of jobs to servers and express the above trade-off. To this aim, time is divided into slots and the assignment occurs at the beginning of a slot. The slot duration is k minutes, and the t-th slot corresponds to the period of [t · k, (t + 1) · k ), where t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . From the time point 0, jobs begin to arrive; the initial slot is slot 0 during which all servers are idle. All jobs that arrive in the period of slot t − 1 will be available at the beginning of slot t, where t = 1, 2, . . . . Among these jobs, the accepted jobs will get served and dispatched to servers at the beginning of slot t. For convenience, we will simply say from a system administrator's perspective that the arrival time of these jobs is t. The discrete-time model is also illustrated in Figure 1 . In this model, the action that changes the states of servers is the assignment of jobs to servers. It occurs only at the beginning of every slot, and their states remain constant in the period of each slot. As a result, if a spot job is executed on a server, it will not be preempted by the high priority of on-demand jobs during a slot and the minimum time that the server dedicates to it is k minutes. Formally, the discrete-time model provides on-demand and spot services with the following properties that quantify the immediacy of on-demand service and persistence of spot service, respectively. Feature 3.1. On-demand users can be latency-critical. Upon arrival, they need to wait for up to k minutes to get served. Feature 3.2. Spot users are usually delay-tolerant. Once bid successfully at a slot and assigned to servers, it is guaranteed that they can persistently get served for k minutes. Only after providing the model for sharing servers will we be able to figure out the framework for assigning jobs and accepting bids. The conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 2 and will be elaborated in the rest of this section. In this article, although all actions of assigning/dispatching, accepting, and pricing jobs occur at the beginning of every slot, we will simply say that they occur at slot t for convenience of exposition.
Dispatching High Priority of On-Demand Jobs
Each on-demand user requests a time slot interval [a j , d j ] in which it can occupy a server to execute its workload where a j and d j are positive integers. We refer to such a request as an on-demand job j. Its arrival time, deadline, and size are a j , d j , and s j = d j − a j + 1, respectively. At every slot t, on-demand jobs with a j = t are dispatched to one of the m servers under a particular policy. Generally, any type of dispatching policies can be applied here. As summarized in [17] , in IaaS services, examples of the commonly used policies include (i) Random: for every job j, choose one of the m servers with the probability 1 m and assign it to this server [28, 45] ; (ii) Round-Robin (RR): jobs are assigned to servers in a cyclical fashion with the j-th job being assigned to the l-th server, where l = j mod m [35] ; (iii) Power of Two Choices (PTC): for every job j, randomly choose two servers, probe them, and assign it to the server with less queued jobs [24, 27] . The RR and Random policies are simple to implement and have similar performance; they are also supported by Amazon EC2 while serving on-demand jobs [7] . The PTC policy is more advanced but recently has been applied to the cluster management practice [27] ; it can achieve a higher utilization of servers [24] . More discussion on dispatching policies can be found in [14, 15, 18, 25] . Once the job j is dispatched to a server, the server will be occupied by the on-demand job owner during the period [a j , d j ], i.e., from the beginning of slot a j until the end of slot d j .
On-demand instances are charged a fixed price; their users can be delay-sensitive and have no willingness to tolerate queuing delay. The current practice to guarantee quick delivery of ondemand instances to users is overprovisioning servers for on-demand jobs. As a result, while processing on-demand jobs, many servers actually remain unoccupied in the long run. The idleness in the on-demand market will be shown in Section 6.2 through experiments and available theoretical results, e.g., the load of the on-demand market corresponds to more than 85% of servers in idle mode. After the job assignment at t, a server is either occupied by an on-demand job or idle in the entire period of slot t. We use M t (resp., M t ) to denote the number of idle (resp., occupied) servers in the period of t, where M t + M t = m. The idleness of the on-demand market necessitates introducing spot instances into the cloud market [9] . In particular, to be economically efficient, what we can do at every slot t is as follows:
• Sell the idle states of the on-demand market in the period of slot t in the form of spot instances. They will be accessed by spot users via bidding, and their amount is M t . • However, on-demand jobs have higher priority to access servers, i.e., once new on-demand jobs arrive at slot t + 1, the instances assigned to spot users at t may be preempted arbitrarily at the beginning of t + 1 to serve on-demand jobs if necessary.
The additional sales of spot instances are supposed to improve the overall resource efficiency of the cloud market in contrast to a pure on-demand market.
Admission Control of Spot Jobs via Pricing
At every slot t, where t = 1, 2, . . . , there are A t users who bid to use spot instances in the period of slot t; they are usually delay-tolerant. The set of these users' bids is denoted by A t . We assume without loss of generality that each user bids for one spot instance. Once the bid 2 of a user is accepted, it gets allocated one spot instance at t. Let π t denote the spot price at t. Following the spirit of spot pricing described in Section 2.1, π t is a control parameter: only the bids whose amounts are not below π t are accepted. The number of idle on-demand instances M t defines the capacity of the spot market, i.e., the number of bids accepted at t cannot exceed M t . Before defining a scheme for accepting bids, we first classify the bids available at t from a system administrator's perspective. This will help us describe which bids are accepted and understand how to assign these bids to servers in the next section. A physical spot user may bid once or several times in order to use spot instances at one or several slots; every time, its bid may be accepted or rejected. It stops bidding when either its entire job is completed or it wants to use other resources (e.g., on-demand instances) to complete its job. If a spot user's bid is accepted at several consecutive slots, its spot job may be assigned to and executed on the same server in this period. However, once its bid is rejected at a slot and accepted at a later slot t, it can be viewed as a user newly arrived at t since it is not associated with and can be assigned to any server at t.
Thus, we will classify the bids of spot users at t according to their bidding behavior at the adjacent slot t − 1. There are two types of bids where A t = J t ∪ J t :
(i) J t : the bids of the spot users whose bids were also accepted at slot t − 1; (ii) J t : the bids of the spot users who newly arrived in the period of [(t − 1) · k, t · k ).
It is important to note that if t = 1, J t = ∅ since there are no bids accepted at the initial slot t − 1 = 0 during which there are newly arriving bids alone. For each bid of J t , its owner also bids at t − 1. As seen later, at t − 1 and t, the two bids will be assigned to the same server when there is no interference from the high priority of on-demand jobs. Finally, A t denotes all bids available at t: J t is illustrated by the orange and gold rectangles in Figure 3 ; J t is illustrated by the light-blue and dark-blue rectangles.
Acceptance of spot jobs. The decision to accept bids is made at the beginning of slot t. To describe the bids accepted at a slot, we define a function as follows. Generally, let J = {1, 2, . . . , J } denote a set of users who submit bids where J = |J | and let V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . ,v J } denote the set of their bids, where v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v J . Let α denote a non-negative real number; we define a function as follows:
(1) F (α, J ) denotes all users whose bids are no lower than α. The number of the bids whose amounts are not below π t is |F (π t , A t )|. The procedure for determining which bids are accepted is A Framework for Allocating Server Time to Spot and On-Demand Services 20:9 Fig. 3 . Color chart for the classification of spot jobs/bids available at t when t ≥ 2: we note that, when t = 1, there are only bids of J t and no other bids, e.g., J t = ∅.
ALGORITHM 1: Determination of Bids Accepted at t
accept |F (π t , A t )| bids of A t with the highest bid prices; presented in Algorithm 1; at slot t, the number of accepted bids is the minimum of M t and |F (π t , A t )|, i.e.,
Also, we note that M t and A t are observable at the beginning of slot t and thus known by CSP. We denote byĴ t (resp.,Ĵ t ) the accepted bids of J t (resp., J t ). Here,Ĵ t andĴ t are illustrated by gold and dark-blue rectangles in Figure 3 . In the rest of this section, we shall refer to the color chart of Figure 3 to support the description of job assignments with a graphical representation.
Assignment of Spot Jobs to Servers
At every slot t = 1, 2, . . . , all arriving on-demand jobs will be accepted but only a part of the bids may be accepted. On-demand jobs have higher priority; when dispatching them to servers, the existence of spot jobs is ignored as if there were a pure on-demand market. The scheme for assigning jobs to servers is as follows:
Step 1. On-demand jobs are dispatched to servers using a policy such as Random, RR, or PTC.
Step 2. In the case that t ≥ 2, if an on-demand job is dispatched to a server that was executing a spot job inĴ t in the period of slot t − 1, this spot job is migrated to another idle server; the other jobs inĴ t are still executed on the same instances. In the case that t = 1, go to the next step directly sinceĴ t = ∅. Step 3. The spot jobs ofĴ t are randomly dispatched to the remaining idle servers.
In the period of slot 0, all servers are in idle states. At the beginning of slot 1, there are only bids of J t and no bids inĴ t ; these bids are assigned to servers after the assignment of on-demand jobs. When t ≥ 2, a part of the servers might be occupied by on-demand and spot jobs in the period of slot t − 1; the process of assigning jobs to servers is illustrated in Figure 4 . We note that, when t = 1, the states of all servers at t − 1 will be represented by blank rectangles and the second step in the process of assigning jobs to servers could be removed since nothing is executed. Fig. 4 . Assignment of on-demand and spot jobs to servers at the beginning of slot t when t ≥ 2: a colored rectangle denotes either a job of some type or the state of a server (i.e., a server occupied by this type of job); the meaning of different colors is partially summarized in Figure 3 ; a blank rectangle denotes an idle server. 
OPTIMAL PRICING OF SPOT INSTANCES
In this section, we shall determine the optimal spot price to maximize the CSP's revenue at every slot t. We denote it by π * t : it is the spot price finally announced to users at t. It actually determines the subset of bids accepted by Algorithm 1. Then, we will wrap up the discussions in Section 3 and Section 4 by showing the whole framework for running spot and on-demand services.
As is formally shown later, the optimal spot price may be the bid of some user. This can be intuitively perceived by contradiction: if the value of π * t is between two bids, the revenue of a CSP will be increased by resetting π * t to the larger bid price; doing so does not affect the acceptance of spot jobs. To determine which bid can maximize the revenue, we need to characterize the CSP's revenue function under an arbitrary spot price π t . Under π t , the accepted bidsĴ t ∪Ĵ t are determined by the framework in Section 3 (illustrated in Figure 2 ). The framework for pricing spot instances at t is illustrated in Figure 5 and will be elaborated in the following.
Billing and Revenue
We first define the value that a CSP gets from each spot job accepted at t, i.e., the way of billing. The reference time interval for billing an on-demand user is made of L consecutive slots. The price 20:11 of using an instance for one interval is p: we recall that if a user employs just a fraction of an interval, it is still charged the fee of the entire interval.
Conversely, for each accepted bid, we should define the billing way according to the effective utilization time of a spot instance. We observe that, although a spot instance is assigned by reserving a whole slot time, there may still be some overhead. In fact, in some cases, a process of startup/migration is needed: it takes some time during which the job is in service but inactive. The spot price at slot t is π t ; to be comparable with the on-demand price, π t is the price of using a spot instance for an interval of L slots. However, we shall use a proper normalization, since π t is limited to represent the spot price of slot t. For example, if a spot user effectively uses an instance for 1 minute during the slot t, the actual charged price will be π t /(L · k ), where a slot contains k minutes. Now, we observe the period in which servers are effectively used by spot jobs after the job assignment at t. Recall the job assignment process in Section 3.4. For spot jobs newly accepted J t , their VMIs need to be loaded to the assigned servers. As illustrated in Figure 4 , some spot jobs ofĴ t may need migration, denoted byĴ t,1 , and their VMIs also need to be migrated to other servers. As shown in related studies [22, 29] , for state-of-the-art technology, the process of loading or migrating VMIs takes about 3 minutes. Generally, we denote the time consumed for this process by k minutes. Thus, for the jobs ofĴ t ∪Ĵ t,1 , although the whole period of a slot will be dedicated to them, only k − k minutes are effectively used, with k minutes not used for actual service. For the other spot jobs ofĴ t , they were executed on some servers at t − 1 and will still be executed on the same servers at t; we denote these bids byĴ t,2 , whereĴ t,2 =Ĵ t −Ĵ t,1 . The bids ofĴ t,2 can effectively use the whole slot t. In order to guarantee that the effective server utilization time of every accepted bid is positive, the following relation needs to be satisfied:
Let β = k k , where β ∈ (0, 1), and every spot job will be charged for the period in which the servers are effectively used. Thus, we have the following definition.
Definition 4.1. The way of billing a spot user at t is as follows: (i) every accepted bid inĴ t ∪Ĵ t,1 is charged (1 − β ) · π t L , and (ii) every accepted bid inĴ t,2 is charged π t L . Now, we characterize the revenue function and show which system information is observable at the beginning of t. Given any spot price π t , the accepted bids (i.e.,Ĵ t ,Ĵ t,1 ,Ĵ t,2 ) are determined by Algorithm 1, before which on-demand jobs have been assigned to servers. Also, we know the locations of the servers to which the bids accepted at t − 1 are assigned, as illustrated in Figure 4 . Thus, after the bids accepted at t are determined, we could know the bids inĴ t,1 ,Ĵ t,2 , andĴ t , respectively. Let f t denote the total number of the accepted bids ofĴ t ∪Ĵ t,1 ; f t is also observable after the accepted bids are determined. The total number of the bids accepted at t is N t ; thus, |Ĵ t,2 | = N t − f t . The revenue of the spot market at t is the sum of the charges of all accepted bids, denoted by G(t ); with the billing policy in Definition 4.1, we have that
where N t is given in Equation (2), L and β are system parameters, and f t is observable.
Pricing Decision
Our decision-making problem is determining the optimal π t to maximize the spot market's revenue G(t ) at slot t. By Equation (2), N t is a function of π t , A t , and M t ; the revenue function G(t ) in
// the optimal spot price at slot t Equation (3) can be expressed as a function of the single variable π t , i.e.,
where parameters M t , A t , and f t are observable at slot t. Sort the spot jobs of A t in the nonincreasing order of their bids; let v j denote the bid of the j-th spot job, where
where
then, we draw the following conclusion.
Lemma 4.2. In order to maximize the revenue of the spot market at slot t, the optimal spot price is such that π * t ∈ V t . Let N * t denote the number of bids accepted at t and we have that π * t = v N * t . Proof. Suppose that in an optimal solution N * t bids are accepted; as defined in Section 3.3, only the bids whose prices are no lower than π * t are possibly accepted, and these bids are the N * t bids of A t with the highest bid prices. If N * t = 0, no bid is accepted at t and π t can be an arbitrary value larger than v 1 ; thus, π * t can be set to v 0 . If N * t > 0, the optimal spot price π * t ≤ v N * t . Then, the CSP's revenue function G(t ), given in Equation (3), is maximized when setting π * t to the highest possible price, i.e., π * t = v N * t . The reason for this is that, when π t ∈ [0, v N * t ] and the number of accepted bids N t is fixed and equals N * t , G(t ) is an increasing function of π t since N t − β · f t > 0, where N t ≥ f t and β ∈ (0, 1). Finally, the lemma holds. Proposition 4.3. The optimal spot price π * t at slot t is as follows:
Proof. The optimal spot price at t is some value in V t under which G(t ) achieves the maximal value, by Lemma 4.2; hence, the proposition holds.
At every slot t, the expression in Equation (6) could be used to decide the optimal spot price. The corresponding procedure is presented in Algorithm 2: it checks every possible value in V t to see which can maximize the revenue function (3) . A key feature of our algorithm is that such decisions are implementable in practice, since the CSP has full knowledge of all parameters in G(t ) except the control parameter, i.e., the spot price π t , at every t.
Running Spot and On-Demand Services
So far, we have shown in Section 3 and Section 4 an integral framework for running spot and on-demand services. Now, we explain how this framework works as a whole.
Sharing model. The discrete-time service model is proposed in Section 3.1 for sharing server time among on-demand and spot jobs where time is divided into consecutive slots. The jobs that arrive in the period of slot t − 1 will be assigned at the next slot t, as illustrated in Figure 1 , where t = 1, 2, . . . . The action (i.e., job assignment) that changes the states of servers happens only at the beginning of each slot t and their states keep constant along the time slot. After the job assignment, an on-demand job j will use the server for s j slots while an accepted spot job can stably access the server for one slot.
Job assignment, pricing, and acceptance. While running on-demand and spot services, several actions are coordinated to control the job's access to servers and they occur sequentially at every slot t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . At t, on-demand jobs are first dispatched to servers that initiate two processes. The first is the calculation of the optimal spot price π * t at t: with the framework in Section 3 (illustrated in Figure 2 ), we could determine by Algorithm 1 the bids accepted at t under an arbitrary spot price π t . Based on this, by the framework illustrated in Figure 5 , π * t could be derived. The second process actually determines the acceptance and assignment of spot jobs: π * t is the final spot price announced to users and is actually used as the input of the framework illustrated in Figure 2 ; then, the actions of accepting bids and assigning spot jobs to servers occur.
We have concluded the presentation of the basic framework. Finally, we analyze the spot user's behavior from a game theory perspective. For every spot user j, the willingness to pay (WTP) of j is the maximum price at or below which it can accept the spot service; we denote its WTP by c j . If the bid of j is accepted and it gets spot service at t, let ς j denote the effective server utilization time during the slot t; letô j = (c j − π t ) · ς j L , and the payoff of j equalsô j . If its bid is rejected, the payoff equals zero. In any case, we denote by o j the payoff of j. A spot user j will truthfully report its WTP if its payoff o j is maximal or at least not less by being truthful, regardless of what the others do. Proposition 4.4. At every slot t, when a user j bids for spot instances, it will truthfully report its WTP to the CSP, i.e., its bid v j equals its WTP c j .
Proof. There are A t bids whose amounts satisfy (5) . By Lemma 4.2 and Algorithm 1, we have in an optimal solution that the N t bids with the highest amounts will be accepted and π t = v N t . Thus, we have that (1) all bids whose amounts are larger than π t will be accepted, (2) a bid whose amount equals π t is possibly accepted, subject to the capacity constraint, and (3) all bids whose amounts are lower than π t will be rejected. It suffices to show that the payoff of j is maximal or not less by being truthful regardless of the value of π t . When j misreports its WTP, there are two cases: (i) v j > c j and (ii) v j < c j . First, we analyze the first case. (i.a) If π t > v j , user j is rejected with o j = 0 no matter whether it is truthful. (i.b) If π t = v j , it may be accepted or not; we have that o j =ô j < 0 if accepted and o j = 0 otherwise. By being truthful, it is rejected with
it is accepted with o j = 0; by being truthful, we also have that o j = 0 no matter whether it is accepted. (i.e) If π t < c j , it is accepted and gets the same payoff o j no matter whether it is truthful. Next, we analyze the second case in a similar way. (ii.a) If π t < v j , it is accepted and gets the same payoff no matter whether it is truthful. (ii.b) If π t = v j , it may be accepted or not with the payoff o j equalingô j or 0; by being truthful, it is accepted with
by being truthful, it may be accepted or not with o j = 0 in any case. (ii.e) If π t > c j , it is rejected with o j = 0 no matter whether it is truthful. Based on this analysis, we can conclude that the payoff of j is maximal or not less by being truthful; thus, the proposition holds.
AN EXTENDED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we provide further insight into the basic framework introduced in Section 3 and Section 4, and propose an extension attaining higher quality of service. 
Limitation to Usability
In the basic framework, the slot duration has two implications as indicated in Feature 3.1 and Feature 3.2. First, since an on-demand job may arrive at any time point in the period of a slot and will get served at the beginning of the next slot, the delivery of computing service is delayed to some extent. In the worst case, up to k minutes are required before being allocated. This can harm the quality of on-demand service and
• from an on-demand user's perspective, it may hope that the slot duration is not large.
Second, upon acceptance of a spot job at a slot t, a server will be allocated to this job. The slot duration represents the guaranteed time that the server will dedicate to the job. Such a spot job risks being rejected at the next slot t + 1 since the spot price may change. Furthermore, spot jobs newly accepted or spot jobs migrated to another server to prioritize new on-demand jobs face a process of migrating or loading VMIs, which takes k minutes, e.g., k approximates 3 under current technology. Ultimately, such spot jobs can effectively use servers for k − k minutes, where k > k . Thus, we have that • from a spot user's perspective, it may hope that the slot duration is properly large.
In the basic framework, both the persistence of spot service and the immediacy of on-demand service depend on the slot duration; it is difficult to simultaneously satisfy the requirements of ondemand and spot users. In fact, in Amazon EC2, k is set to 5; in this case, upon acceptance of a bid at t, 3 minutes are wasted while 2 minutes are effectively used, as illustrated in Figure 6 ; however, an on-demand user may need to wait for up to 5 minutes to get served. Finally, we observe that the process of loading or migrating VMIs requires additional system resources (e.g., bandwidth) to be consumed. From a system administrator's perspective, the convenience of the spot-pricing scheme may be reduced if it generates a large number of such operations.
Our Improvement: Implementing Spot Pricing in Parallel
In this section, we propose an extended framework to solve the trade-off between the persistence of spot service and the immediacy of on-demand service; here, the basic framework of Section 3 and Section 4 will be implemented in parallel on multiple groups of servers that alternatingly serve the jobs that arrive at different slots.
Parallelized model. There are a total of m servers. In the basic framework, every job accepted at t will be assigned to one of the m servers, where t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . Now, the servers are divided into b groups, and the i-th group consists of m i servers, where b i=1 m i = m. For all on-demand and spot jobs accepted at any slot t, there exists an i ∈ [1, b] such that all of these jobs will be assigned to the servers of the i-th group. Here, t and i satisfy the following relation: Fig. 7 . An extended framework: for all i ∈ [1, 3] , the i-th group serves the jobs arriving and accepted at slot
where b is a system parameter; for example, if b = 2, the jobs arriving at slot t = 1, 3, 5, . . . will be served by the first group of servers. In other words, for all i ∈ [1, b] , the i-th group is an independent processing unit that serves the on-demand and spot jobs that arrive at slot t = h · b + i (i.e., in the period of slot t − 1), where h = 0, 1, 2, . . .; these jobs arrive every b slots. Within any group, the schemes for processing jobs are similar to the ones in the basic framework, which will be elaborated on later. At the i-th group, the action of assigning jobs to servers occurs only at the beginning of slot
The key observation is that only such actions will change the server states and the server states of the i-th group keep constant for b slots, i.e., b · k minutes. Now, we have two parameters k and b to control the jobs' waiting and service time. After the assignment of jobs at t, the spot jobs can use the assigned server for b slots without being interrupted by the high priority of on-demand jobs that arrive at the subsequent b − 1 slots. Those latter ondemand jobs will be served by the other b − 1 groups of servers. Such an extended framework is also illustrated in Figure 7 , where b = 3, and it has the following two features that quantify the immediacy of on-demand service and the persistence of spot service: Feature 5.1. Upon arrival, on-demand users need to wait for up to k minutes to get served.
Feature 5.2. Once spot users bid successfully, it is guaranteed that they can persistently get served for b · k minutes.
Parameter Setting. In this framework, the parameters k , b, k, and L are set to satisfy the following relations: (i) k < b · k, and (ii) L is the multiple of b, i.e., K = L b is an integer. The first relation guarantees for each accepted bid that the effective server utilization time is positive, i.e., b · k − k > 0; here, the value of k can be smaller than k . Instead, to guarantee this, it is required that k > k in the basic framework of Section 3 and Section 4. Thus, in the extended framework, we can set the length of a slot to a small value, which can adequately guarantee the immediacy of on-demand service by Feature 5.1. For example, we set k = 1 (minute); then, an on-demand job needs to wait for at most 1 minute to get served. On the other hand, we can set b to a large value such that b · k > k , which can adequately guarantee the persistence of spot service by Feature 5.2. For example, when b = 30, the minimum time that a server dedicates to an accepted bid is up to 30 minutes. As a result, with the extended framework, we can properly address the two seemingly conflicting requirements from the spot and on-demand users above. We also illustrate in Figure 8 another case where k = 5, b = 3, and k = 3, in contrast to Figure 6 . Here, upon acceptance of a bid, 3 minutes are wasted and 12 minutes are effectively used. At the i-th group, on-demand jobs arrive at t = h · b + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . .; they have higher priority to access servers and are dispatched to the servers first. Recall that the reference time interval for billing an on-demand user is made of L consecutive slots. Thus, the size s j of an ondemand job j can be viewed as the multiple of L (slots) and let τ j = s j L . After the assignment of j at slot t, it will occupy a server for s j = b · K · τ j slots. The second relation guarantees that the number of slots occupied by j is the multiple of b. Thus, for all t = h · b + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . . , if the slot t of a server is occupied by an on-demand job, the entire period of [t , t + b − 1] will be occupied by this job.
Job assignment, acceptance, and pricing. For all i ∈ [1, b] , the i-th processing unit is a single system where the way of processing jobs is the same as the way of the basic framework, except that there are only m i servers available and jobs arrive every b slots, i.e., at t = h · b + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In the following, we apply the notion in the basic framework to the scenario here and show the process of assigning and accepting jobs, as described in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 and illustrated in Figure 2 . Then, we explain the process of determining the optimal spot price at t, as described in Section 4 and illustrated in Figure 5 .
After the assignment of on-demand jobs, the idle servers of the i-th unit in the period of [t, t + b − 1] are sold as spot instances, where t = h · b + i and h = 0, 1, 2, . . . . We denote their amount by M (i ) t , which is also the capacity of accepting bids at t. Spot users arrive at every such slot t and bid to use spot instances. All bids available at t are denoted by A t = J i,t ∪ J i,t : J i,t denotes the bids that belong to the spot users whose bids have been accepted at t − b and who continue bidding at t, and J i,t denotes the bids newly arriving and submitted at any time point in the period of slot t − 1.
Replacing the J t , J t , and M t of Algorithm 1 with J i,t , J i,t , and M (i ) t , we could get the procedure for accepting bids in this section. As is given in Equation (2), the number of accepted bids at t depends on the spot price π t , the available bids A t , and the number of spot instance M (i ) t and is
LetĴ i,t denote the accepted bids in J i,t andĴ i,t denote the accepted bids in J i,t . The procedure of assigning spot jobs to servers is the same as the procedure in Section 3.4 after (i) we replace the accepted bidsĴ t andĴ t withĴ i,t andĴ i,t , and (ii) we replace the period of slot t − 1 in
Step 2 with the period of [t − b, t − 1]. Once an instance is offered to a spot job, the instance will dedicate b time slots to this job. For the accepted bids where the operation of loading or migrating VMIs is needed, their amount is denoted by f (i ) t , which is observable. Recall that β = k k and there are f (i ) t accepted bids whose effective server utilization time is b · k − k minutes, i.e., b − β slots. For the other accepted bids, the effective utilization time is b slots and their amount is N (i ) t − f (i ) t . As stated in Definition 4.1, the instances will be charged for the period in which they are effectively used for executing workload, excluding the period in which VMIs are loaded or migrated; the price of effectively using an instance for a slot is π t L . Similar to Equation (3), the revenue from the spot market at t is as follows: where K = L b . With Equation (8), G (i ) (t ) can be transformed as a function of the single variable π t :
where M (i ) t , A t , and f (i ) t are observable at slot t. As we conclude in Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.3, the optimal spot price at t is in V t and is such that
the corresponding procedure is presented by Algorithm 2, i.e., SpotiPrice
After giving the framework for running on-demand and spot services, a further objective of this article is evaluating its performance. In the extended framework, the states of all servers still keep constant in the period of every slot; for all l ∈ [1, b], we denote by M (l ) t the number of servers of the l-th processing unit used as on-demand instances at slot t.
t , denoting the total number of instances that are occupied by on-demand jobs at t. Recall that the price of using an on-demand instance for L slots is p, and at slot t the revenue from the on-demand market is
In contrast, the revenue from the spot market at t is G (i ) (t ), given in Equation (9). The revenue improvement brought by the spot market is measured by the following ratio:
The ratio α t represents how much the CSP's revenue could be improved at slot t after complementing the on-demand market with a spot market. The revenue improvement α t is a main performance metric of this article.
An Efficiency Analysis
The extended framework of this section allows us to use some assumptions to derive an analytical result. The aim is to characterize the revenue improvement α t with a simple mathematical expression; it helps us clearly understand which factors are affecting the revenue improvement when the on-demand market is complemented with a spot market via the framework proposed in this article. The two assumptions are that (i) the product b · k is set to a large enough value and (ii) at every slot t, the prices of all bids A t follow a uniform distribution over [π , π ], as is used for cloud services in [46] . here, π and π are the maximum and minimum bid prices of users, and π can be viewed as the on-demand price p, i.e., π = p. We emphasize that our framework itself does not rely on such assumptions in order to run on-demand and spot services. Under the first assumption, we have that k b ·k = β b → 0, where k is a fixed parameter; furthermore, f (i ) t /N (i ) t ≤ 1. Thus, by Equation (9), the revenue from the spot market at every slot t can be approximated as
Under the second assumption, we have that the expected number of bids whose prices are not below π t is |F (π t , A t )| = A t · (π − π t )/(π − π ). The number of accepted bids given in Equation (8) can be transformed as
subject to the constraint that N (i )
With Equation (15), the constraint translates to π t ≥ π t . Since π t ∈ [π , π ], the spot price at t should satisfy
Finally, at any slot t = h · b + i, we have from Equations (14) and (15) that the CSP's revenue from the spot market is as follows:
At t, A t is observable; G (i ) (t ) is a quadratic function of π t subject to Equation (17). We let ρ = π /π and get the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. At every slot t, the optimal spot price π * t and the maximum revenue from the spot market are as follows:
where π t is given in Equation (16),
, and ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. For the quadratic function G (i ) (t ), the axis of symmetry is a vertical line x = π 2 . Its maximum value is achieved at (i) π t = π 2 if π 2 ∈ [π t , π ] and at (ii) π t = π t if π 2 < π t . In each case, the π t is the optimal spot price. In the latter case, there are two subcases: (ii.a) if π ≥ π t , the optimal spot price π * t is π ; (ii.b) if π < π t , π * t = π t . In case (i), the condition π 2 ∈ [π t , π ] is equivalent to the condition π 2 ≥ π t , which requires both π 2 ≥ π t and π 2 ≥ π by Equation (16); due to ρ = π /π , this condition is equivalent to the condition ρ ≤ min{0.5, 1 − D/2}. In case (ii), the condition is equivalent to ρ > min{0.5, 1 − D/2}. The condition π ≥ π t in case (ii.a) is equivalent to D ≤ 1; thus, the conditions to make π * t = π are ρ > min{0.5, 1 − D/2} and D ≤ 1, which are further equivalent to ρ > 1 2 and D ≤ 1. Similarly, in case (ii.b), the conditions to make π * t = π t are ρ > 1 − D/2 and D > 1. Finally, substituting the optimal spot price π * t in each case into Equation (18), we could get the maximum revenue G (i ) (t ) in Equation (19) .
Finally, we can quantify the revenue improvement α t , and the conclusion below follows directly from Equation (13) and Proposition 5.1.
Corollary 5.2. The revenue improvement brought by the spot market is as follows:
, and ρ = π /π ∈ (0, 1). A Framework for Allocating Server Time to Spot and On-Demand Services
20:19
Now, we explain the physical meaning of Corollary 5.2. Recall that M (i ) t is the number of spot instances available to serve the bids at t, and they are idle instances in the on-demand market; M (i ) t determines the capacity of accepting bids. A t is the total number of bids at t. M t is the number of instances executing on-demand jobs at t. The ratio D = A t /M (i ) t can be viewed as the saturation degree of spot market at t, e.g., when it is larger than 1, the spot market is fully saturated with bids and not all bids could be accepted with the capacity constraint; when the ratio is zero, there are no bids at t. The ratio ρ is the value density of the users' bids. If ρ is small, the price difference of users' bids is large. Let us consider a scenario where the maximum bid of users π is given and a fixed number of bids with the highest amounts are accepted. If ρ is small, the lowest price of the accepted bids would be small; as a result, the spot price at t is also small, as well as the revenue that the CSP gains from the bids. Similarly, we can have opposite conclusions for the case of a large ρ. In the long run, the mean of M t /b approximates the mean of M (i ) t , and the ratio I =
could be roughly viewed as the vacancy-to-utilization ratio of on-demand market, representing the percentage of servers in idle states at slot t. If the vacancy-to-utilization ratio is large and the CSP does not offer spot service, only a small part of on-demand instances are effectively used by ondemand jobs and most are in idle states at t. For example, if the ratio is 7, it implies that 87.5% of the instances will be in idle states.
By Equations (20) and (13), the vacancy-to-utilization ratio of on-demand market I , the saturation degree of spot market D, and the value density ρ together determine the revenue improvement α t after complementing the on-demand market with a spot market. We have by Equation (20) that the larger the value density ρ, the larger the revenue improvement. For example, in the case that ρ is large and the saturation degree of the spot market is low (i.e., D ≤ 1 and ρ > 0.5), the best strategy is accepting all bids A t at t, achieving the maximum α t . In the following, we consider another setting where the value density is small (i.e., ρ ≤ 0.5). Suppose that the value density ρ is 0.2. The vacancy-to-utilization ratio of the on-demand market is fixed and is mainly determined by the QoS guarantee offered to the arriving on-demand jobs. Since the jobs require a quick response from the CSP, its value is usually small, and we set I to 7. Then, we have that
Here, if the saturation degree of the spot market is large (i.e., D = A t /M (i ) t > 1.6), we have that after complementing the on-demand market with a spot market, the revenue improvement α t is no smaller than 3.5, representing at least a 3.5-fold increase in the CSP's revenue. If the saturation degree is small (i.e., A t /M (i ) t ≤ 1.6), the revenue improvement α t is 2.1875 times the saturation degree of the spot market.
Finally, we observe that our derivation and observation above can be generalized in principle by relaxing assumption (ii) and letting H (π t ) be a general probability distribution for the bids at every slot t over the support [π , π ]. Then, Equation (15) H (π t ) ) and the revenue of the spot market in Equation (18) becomes G (i ) (t ) = A t · (1 − H (π t )) · π t /K. The maximum revenue might be achieved when the spot price π t is such that the differential of G (i ) (t ) equals zero. Under any distribution, one may observe that the revenue improvement α t may mainly depend on the vacancy-to-utilization ratio of on-demand market I , the saturation degree of spot market D, and the value density ρ. For example, given the amount of servers, a larger I means that more servers are idle for accepting bids; given the amount of spot instances and the distribution of bids, a larger D means that more bids are available and the CSP can choose to accept the bids with higher amounts. In both cases, a higher revenue improvement may be achieved.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide numerical validation for the proposed framework.
Experimental Setting
Time is divided into consecutive slots; each slot contains k = 5 minutes. On-demand instances are charged on an hourly basis and an hour contains L = 12 slots. We set b to 6, i.e., all servers are divided into 6 groups (also called processing units). For all i ∈ [1, 6] , the i-th group has m i servers; its value will be given in Section 6.2.1. For all i ∈ [1, 6] , the i-th group is used to process the ondemand and spot jobs that arrive at slots t = 6 · h + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . . . An exception occurs in Section 6.2, where we take different values for b to show its effect on the idleness of the on-demand market.
Components of On-Demand and Spot Services.
We have explained in Section 4.3 the basic framework; the final framework divides all servers into 6 groups. For all i ∈ [1, 6] , at the beginning of slot t = 6 · h + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the job pricing, acceptance, and assignment of the i-th group are similar to the ones of the basic framework, and there are four main components:
1. Dispatching on-demand jobs. We use the PTC policy to dispatch jobs to servers, as described in Section 3.2. On-demand users can be latency-critical and user-facing services have to meet strict tail-latency requirements at the 99th percentile of the distribution [8] .
In other words, for every 100 jobs, there is at most one job that will miss its deadline. For the i-th processing unit, there are m i servers, where m i is the minimum number of servers needed to guarantee the latency requirement; its value is given in Section 6.2.1. If the number of servers is larger than m i , more servers will be idle in the on-demand market and a higher revenue from the spot market may be achieved. 2. Accepting spot jobs. As explained in Section 5.2, we apply Algorithm 1 to the i-th group for determining which bids are accepted at slot t. 3. Assigning spot jobs to servers. As explained in Section 5.2, we apply the procedure proposed in Section 3.4 to the i-th group for assigning spot jobs at t. 4. Optimally pricing spot instances. We use the algorithm SpotiPrice(M (i ) t , A t , f (i ) t , K, β/b), described by Algorithm 2, to determine the spot price π t at t. The time spent on loading or migrating VMIs is set to 3 minutes, i.e., k = 3; here, β = k k = 0.6. Finally, we use Equation (9) to determine the revenue from the spot market at t. (13) and it is the ratio of the revenue of the spot market to the revenue of the on-demand market at a slot t. The average revenue improvement per slot is the average value of all α t , where t = 1, 2, 3, . . . and it is denoted by α e . In our experiments, the main performance metric is α e , which represents how much the CSP's revenue is increased after complementing the on-demand market with a spot market.
Performance Metrics. Recall that α t is defined in Equation
Furthermore, for all i ∈ [1, 6] , the i-th processing unit is used to process the jobs arriving at slot t = 6 · h + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . . . We assume that a super-slot contains 6 slots (i.e., 30 minutes). From the i-th slot on, the server state of the i-th unit changes every super-slot; the h -th super-slot corresponds to the period of [t, t + 5], where h = 1, 2, . . . and t = 6 · (h − 1) + i. In our experiments, we also show the average server utilization per super-slot. In the case that the CSP offers both on-demand and spot instances (resp., on-demand instances alone), the utilization at a specific super-slot h is defined as the ratio of the number of instances occupied by on-demand and spot jobs (resp., on-demand jobs) to the total number of instances available (i.e., m i ), denoted by θ (i ) t , where h = (t − i)/6 + 1. In both cases, the average server utilization per super-slot is simply defined as the average value of θ (1) 1 , θ (2) 2 , . . . , θ (6) 6 , θ (1) 7 , . . . , θ (6) 12 , θ (1) 13 , . . . , which is denoted by θ when only on-demand instances are offered and by μ when both instances are offered. With the values of θ and μ, we can numerically see the improvement to server utilization after complementing the on-demand market with a spot market.
As analyzed in Section 5.3, the revenue improvement may mainly depend on three factors: (i) the vacancy-to-utilization ratio of the on-demand market, (ii) the saturation degree of the spot market, and (iii) the distribution of users' bids. The first factor is mainly determined by the QoS guarantee offered to on-demand users and is specified in Section 6.1.1; the related results are given in Section 6.2.1. Thus, the environments of our experiments will vary in terms of the distribution of users' bid prices and the arrival rate of bids; the main results will be given in Section 6.3.
Arrival of On-Demand Jobs.
A public CSP such as Amazon EC2 serves many users of different sources; it is representative to use a heavy-tailed distribution to model the job size and a poisson distribution to model the job arrival [6, 43] , which has been validated by some measurement study [45] . At every slot t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , the number of job arrivals follows a Poisson distribution with a mean λ o . A job's size is a random variable x that follows a bounded Pareto distribution with a scale parameter x m and a shape parameter α; x ranges in [x m , x]. Since ondemand instances are charged on an hourly basis, we further set the sizes of the jobs submitted to the CSP to 12 · x 12 . For a job j with size s j and arrival time a j , its deadline is d j = a j + s j − 1. The on-demand price is normalized as 1. In the whole system, there are 6 processing units and for all i ∈ [1, 6] , the i-th unit can be viewed as a single system used to process the jobs arriving at slot t = 6 · h + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Thus, each unit will process the jobs with the same statistical feature in terms of the arrival rate and the job size. In the experiments, λ o , x m , and α are set to 60, 6, and 7 6 , respectively. Then, the mean of that Pareto distribution is 42 (slots); the lower and upper bounds of the job size are 0.5 and 13 hours. An exception occurs in Section 6.2.1, where we take different values for λ o , α, x to show their effect on the idleness of the on-demand market.
Arrival and Departure of Spot Jobs.
At every slot t, there are users that newly arrive and bid for spot instances; among these users, we assume that their bids follow some probability distribution. At every t, the bids of these users vary in terms of arrival rate and their value distribution. In our simulations, we consider two value distributions. The first is a uniform distribution over [0.2, 1], following [46] . The other is a bounded Pareto distribution with a Pareto index α = 2 and a scale parameter x m = 0.3, following [2] ; its lower and upper bounds are 0.3 and 1, respectively. Given a Pareto distribution with α = 2 and x m = 0.3, its mean is α ·x m α −1 = 0.6, and the probability that a random variable x takes on a value larger than x 0 is ( x m x 0 ) α , e.g., the probability that x > 0.6 is 0.25. Thus, with the bounded Pareto distribution, the proportion of the bids whose amounts are low are larger.
All servers are divided into 6 groups; for all i ∈ [1, 6] , the i-th group serves the bids accepted at t = 6 · h + i, where h = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The number x (i ) t of the bids that newly arrive at t = 6 · h + i follows a geometric distribution, similar to [46] . Thus, x (i ) t is a random variable that denotes the number of failures before one success in a series of independent trials, where each trial results in either success or failure and the probability of success is the constant q i = 1/ m i /ϕ . The mean and variance of x (i ) t are (1 − q i )/q i and (1 − q i )/q 2 i ; roughly, for all i ∈ [1, 6] , the mean bid arrival rate of the i-th processing unit is 1 ϕ times its processing capacity, i.e., m i ϕ − 1. In our simulations, we consider three types of spot market that are fully, moderately, and poorly saturated with bids; correspondingly, the parameter ϕ is set to 1, 2.5, and 5, respectively, and its value determines the number of spot jobs that newly arrive at t.
Once the bid of a user is accepted, the assigned instance will dedicate b = 6 slots (i.e., 30 minutes) to it. Among the users whose bids are accepted at t = 6 · h + i, each will continue bidding at t + 6 at a probability 1 − ϱ and stop bidding at a probability ϱ; the value of ϱ is chosen from a uniform distribution over {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}. The mean of ϱ is 0.3; on average, at the beginning of each t + 6, 30% of the users accepted at t will stop bidding while the remaining 70% will continue bidding. We denote by y (i ) t the number of spot users who are accepted at t and will continue bidding at t , where t = t + b = 6 · (h + 1) + i. Thus, at the i-th group of servers, for all t = 6 · h + i, where h = 1, 2, . . . , the total number of bids available is x (i ) t + y (i ) t ; for the initial slot i, there are only bids that newly arrive and the total number of bids is x (i ) i .
Idleness in the On-Demand Market
In this section, we show the resource utilization when the CSP provides only on-demand instances. This helps better perceive the advantage of selling the idle states of on-demand instances as spot instances, although this practice has been adopted by Amazon EC2. In particular, we will provide both experimental and theoretical results available.
Empirical Results.
We implemented a queuing system to reproduce the utilization of servers. The way of generating and dispatching on-demand jobs and the guaranteed QoS are described in Section 6.1.3 and Section 6.1.1.
We first look at the idleness of the on-demand market when the expected job arrival rate λ o , the shape parameter α, and the upper bound of job size x take different values. In a Pareto distribution, the larger the value of α, the larger the expected job size; the latter is α ·x m α −1 for α > 1. The experiments are run over a period of about 120,000 slots. While a server serves on-demand jobs, some super-slots are unoccupied; the idleness in a period is defined as the ratio of the amount of the unoccupied super-slots of all servers to the amount of the super-slots of all servers, denoted by ϑ . In the first case, we fix x = 156 and α = 7 6 ; the idleness ϑ is 0.8854, 0.8854, and 0.8856 when λ o equals 30, 60, and 90, respectively, which coincides with the theoretical result that server utilization is independent of the job arrival rate given the QoS requirement [24] . In the second case, we fix λ o = 60 and x = 156, and the idleness ϑ is 0.8865, 0.8854, and 0.8769 when α equals 21 20 , 7 6 , and 7 3 . In the third case, we fix λ o = 60 and α = 7 6 , and the idleness ϑ is 0.8854, 0.8877, and 0.8893 when x equals 156, 468, and 1404. The results of the latter two cases imply that the larger the job sizes, the higher the idleness of the on-demand market. Under the different conditions above, we can observe that ϑ varies in a very small range of [0.8769, 0.8893]; the values of λ o , α, and x have slight effect on the idleness. The experimental results here are also consistent with a measurement study in [21] , where some instances of Amazon EC2 are launched and run for 1 week and the observed server utilization is in the 3% to 17% range.
For all i ∈ [1, 6] , recall the definition of θ (i ) t in Section 6.
which denotes the percentage of servers idle and wasted at a super-slot of the i-th processing unit if the CSP does not sell them as spot instances. The average vacancy rateθ (i ) of the i-th unit is defined as the average value of allθ (i ) t , where t = 6 · h + i and h = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Now, we fix λ o = 60, α = 7 6 , and x = 156, where the idleness is moderate; the values ofθ (1) ,θ (2) , . . . ,θ (6) are illustrated in Figure 9 . For example, at the first unit, the percentage of servers idle at every super-slot is 88.56% on average.
In the extended framework of Section 5, in order to have Feature 5.1 and Feature 5.2, we divide servers into multiple groups that alternatingly serve the on-demand jobs arriving at different slots. However, in the basic framework of Section 3 and Section 4, servers are not divided: whenever an on-demand job arrives at any slot, one server will be chosen from all servers to serve it. Now, we show the effect of server division on server utilization. Each experiment has the same job/workload A Framework for Allocating Server Time to Spot and On-Demand Services 20:23 input, guarantees the same QoS described in Section 6.1.1, and is taken with and without server division. We will see that more servers are needed in the non-division scenario; thus, after division, server utilization is improved and under the extended framework the servers are more effectively used by on-demand jobs. In particular, for the first case above, the minimum number of servers needed in the non-division scenario (resp., in the division scenario) is 6,823, 13,594, and 20,421 (resp., 6,105, 12,198, and 18,284) ; the corresponding utilization is improved by 11.76%, 11.44%, and 11.69%. For the second case, the minimum number of servers needed in the non-division scenario (resp., in the division scenario) is 14,589, 13,594, and 8,876 (resp., 13,156, 12,198, and 7,450) . The corresponding utilization is improved by 10.89%, 11.44%, and 19.14%. For the third case, the minimum number of servers needed in the non-division scenario (resp., in the division scenario) is 13,594, 15,970, and 17,837 (resp., 12,198, 14,452, and 16,450) . The corresponding utilization is improved by 11.44%, 10.50%, and 8.432%.
Finally, we show the effect of the number b of processing units on server utilization. Recall the meaning of θ in Section 6.1.2; then,θ = 1 − θ denotes the average percentage of servers idle at every super-slot of all units, also referred to as the vacancy rate. Recall in Section 5.2 that b needs to be a factor of L. We thus set b to 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 12, respectively. Now, we fix λ o = 60, α = 7 6 , and x = 156, and the vacancy rateθ is illustrated in Figure 10 . We can observe thatθ decreases slightly from 0.8980 to 0.8677 as b increases from 1 to 12. On the other hand, we have by Feature 5.2 that the value of b determines the guaranteed duration in which spot jobs can use servers once their bids are accepted. Thus, the choice of b depends significantly on the system designer's experience and view of the quality of spot service.
Theoretical Results.
Results from discrete-time queuing theory can be used to help us perceive the relation between the mean waiting time of on-demand jobs and the utilization of servers. The standard definition for a job's waiting time is the queuing time from its arrival to the moment that it gets assigned. Existing literature considers the case where the job arrival at a server follows a geometric distribution and the job size follows a general distribution. In the context of this article, we can use the round-robin policy in Section 3.2 to uniformly dispatch the arriving on-demand jobs to servers; then, at every server there is a single queue and the mean waiting time of all on-demand jobs will be its counterpart at a server [45] . We denote by σ the job size's standard deviation and by s the mean job size. At a server, the mean waiting time w satisfies the following relation [26] :
where one job arrives at a slot with probability λ and the probability that no jobs arrive is 1 − λ, where λ ∈ [0, 1]; ρ is the mean utilization or load of a server, where ρ = λ · s. By Equation (22), we also have that
In the following, we illustrate the sensitivity of server utilization ρ to waiting time w: the requirement of a short waiting time leads to low utilization in the on-demand market. In this section, all servers are divided into 6 groups; each group can be viewed as a single system where jobs arrive and are dispatched once every super-slot (i.e., 6 slots). To apply the relation in Equation (23) directly, we use in this section the super-slot as the basic time unit for the job size. Since on-demand jobs are charged on an hourly basis, their size will be the multiple of 2 (super-slots); thus, s ≥ 2 and we have by Equation (23) that ρ decreases as w decreases. We assume that the CSP will guarantee that the mean waiting time w is 1 6 super-slot. When the job size follows a uniform distribution over {2, 4, 6}, we have that the mean job size w is 4 and its variance σ 2 is small and equals 2. Then, to guarantee the QoS, we have by Equation (23) that the server utilization is 1 11.5 ≈ 0.08696. In other words, on average, the servers will be in idle state 91.30% of the time. Thus, many servers are in idle states in the on-demand market, which remain to be used by spot users.
Revenue Improvement of Spot Market
In this section, we show the main results of performance evaluation, i.e., the revenue improvement α e as explained in Section 6.1.2. We use α (1) e , α (2.5) e , α (5) e to denote the α e in the case that the spot market is fully, moderately, and poorly saturated, respectively, with bids as explained in Section 6.1.4. The main experimental results are given in the top part of Figure 11 . For example, in the case where the users' bids follow a uniform distribution, if the spot market is saturated with many bids (i.e., the fully saturated case), there is at least a 4.5-fold increase in the CSP's revenue; if the spot market is less saturated (i.e., the poorly saturated case), the CSP's revenue can still be increased by more than 1.5-fold.
For the uniform distribution case, the average value of all spot prices is 0.7756, 0.6624, and 0.6061 in the fully, moderately, and poorly saturated spot market, respectively. The spot price is the minimum price of all accepted bids. With more bids available, the CSP can choose to accept the bids with higher prices; hence, in a more saturated spot market, the average spot price is also higher. The spot prices of the first unit at slot t = 222001 + 6 · h ∈ [222001, 222300] is illustrated in Figure 12 , where h = 0, 1, . . . , 49; we can observe that, if the spot market is saturated to a higher degree, the change of spot prices over time is also larger. Taking all 6 processing units into account, the average number of spot jobs accepted per super-slot is 1,444, 1,065, and 666 in the fully, moderately, and poorly saturated spot market, respectively; correspondingly, the average number of spot jobs newly arriving and accepted is 506.1, 335.1, and 201.2, respectively. Let us consider the poorly and fully saturated markets. Due to the offer of spot instances to users, in the former case, the average utilization of instances is improved from 0.1146 to 0.4441, while the CSP's revenue is improved by 164.1%. In the latter case, the average utilization of instances is improved from 0.1146 to 0.8292, while the CSP's revenue is improved by 461.5%. As far as the first A Framework for Allocating Server Time to Spot and On-Demand Services 20:25 Fig. 11 . The revenue improvement α (ϕ ) e and server utilization μ (ϕ ) when the spot market is fully, moderately, and poorly saturated with bids, corresponding to the cases where ϕ = 1, 2.5, and 5, respectively: the red (resp., blue) stars are for the case where the bids follow a uniform distribution over [0.2, 1] (resp., a bounded Pareto distribution over [0.3, 1] with a Pareto index of 2); we note that, when the CSP offers only on-demand instances, the server utilization θ is 0.1146. unit is concerned, the number of spot instances available and the number of accepted bids at slot t = 222001 + 6 · h ∈ [222001, 222300] are illustrated in Figure 13 , where h = 0, 1, . . . , 49.
Finally, we summarize the average server utilization per super-slot before and after offering spot instances to users. Recall the definition of θ and μ in Section 6.1.2; we use μ (1) , μ (2.5) , and μ (5) to denote the server utilization μ when the spot market is fully, moderately, and poorly saturated with bids. The related results are given in the bottom figure of Figure 11 .
Comparison with a Dynamic Reserve Price Algorithm
The framework for sharing server time among on-demand and spot services in order to optimally price spot instances has four main components as described in Section 6.1.1. The fourth component is actually the one operating the spot pricing mechanism: consistent with the claim of Amazon EC2 [2] , it should rely on the relation of demand and supply, i.e., the bids and the number of spot instances available. We aim at comparing our scheme with the reference scheme proposed by the authors of [2] ; they actually claim that Amazon EC2 may in practice set its spot prices artificially by a dynamic reserve price (DRP) algorithm [2] . In this section, we thus replace the pricing scheme in the fourth component with the DRP algorithm in [2] and show the performance of our framework when the scheme in [2] is applied. The DRP algorithm draws spot prices from a fixed range [F , C], where F and C are the lower and upper bounds of spot prices. In particular, it is initialized with a reserve price of P 0 = F and a price change of Δ 0 = 0.1 · (F − C). At each processing unit, the spot price is updated every 6 slots and the l-th spot price P l is recursively defined as follows, where l = 1, 2, . . .:
where ϵ (σ ) is white noise with a standard deviation σ = 0.39 · (C − F ); here, Δ l may be generated multiple times until the resulting P l is within [F , C] and does not equal P l −1 , i.e., P l ∈ [F , C] − {P l −1 }. In our experiments of Section 6.3, if the users' bids follow the uniform distribution, the minimum and maximum spot prices are (π min , π max ) = (0.5024, 0.9496), (0.5384, 0.8744), and (0.5224, 0.7712) in the fully, moderately, and poorly saturated case, respectively. Correspondingly, if the bids the Pareto distribution, (π min , π max ) is (0.3000, 0.8110), (0.3000, 0.6110), and (0.5048, 0.7272), respectively. In the experiments, we set (F , C) = (π min , π max ) in each case. The related results for revenue improvement are given in the top figure of Figure 14 , and the server utilization after complementing the on-demand market with a spot market is given in the bottom figure of Figure 14 ; the meaning of related symbols has been introduced in Section 6.3.
Overall, we can see from the top figures of Figure 11 and Figure 14 that the proposed algorithm of this article can achieve higher revenue improvement than the DRP algorithm in [2] ; here, the revenue from the on-demand market depends on the utilization of the on-demand market that With the pricing scheme in [2] , the revenue improvement α (ϕ ) e and server utilization μ (ϕ ) when the spot market is fully, moderately, and poorly saturated with bids, corresponding to the cases where ϕ = 1, 2.5, and 5, respectively: the red (resp., blue) stars are for the case where the bids follow a uniform distribution (resp., a bounded Pareto distribution). We note that, when the CSP offers only on-demand instances, server utilization is 0.1146. equals 0.1146. As claimed in [2] , when the spot market is saturated with fewer bids, the use of the DRP scheme can artificially create a false impression of the changes of demand and supply and mask times of low demand and price inactivity, thus possibly driving up the CSP's stock. This is confirmed in our experimental results. As illustrated in Figure 12 , when the spot market is saturated with many bids (e.g., the fully saturated case), the spot prices vary more dramatically over time. However, in the poorly saturated case, the spot prices vary slightly and even keep constant in a relatively long period. Thus, in the poorly saturated case, it may be necessary to set spot prices artificially.
Comparison with Another Framework for On-Demand and Spot Services
We first introduce the framework of Dierks and Seuken in [10, 11] where on-demand and spot markets are modeled as two separate queues Q 1 and Q 2 . For Q 1 , the number of servers m o is the minimum servers needed to guarantee that the expected waiting time of jobs is very short; the price of using a server is p per unit of time. The second Q 2 is a priority queue that has m S servers: every job continuously bids to use the servers of the spot market until it gets enough execution time; jobs with higher bids have higher priorities to use servers. There are n job classes whose expected arrival rates are λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ). The job size is drawn from a probability distribution with expectation 1 μ . For every job of class i, a waiting cost c is drawn from a distribution F i (c) on [0, v i ]. For a job of the spot market, its execution on a server may be preempted when there are unfinished jobs of higher bids; each preemption brings a cost c · τ to it. Let σ = (ζ , η) and σ denote the strategy of a job: when ζ = O, S, or B, it means that this job will choose the on-demand, spot, or neither market; η is the bid if ζ = S. In a Bayesian Nash incentive compatible spot market framework, all participants ideally have the knowledge such as λ, μ, and F 1 (c), . . . , F n (c). Further, each job of class i can derive the optimal strategy σ to maximize its expected payoff. Here, if a job chooses a spot market, its bid will be its waiting cost c and its payment can also be derived. With the payments of jobs, we can get the revenue of both markets. Fig. 15 . Revenue improvement compared with the on-demand and spot model in [11] .
The framework of this article elaborates on the current service model in Amazon EC2. Compared with [11] , the Amazon EC2 model has its advantages in terms of revenue generation and QoS. It allows selling the idle state of the on-demand market on the spot market to get additional revenue [2, 9] . A complication of the model in [11] lies in that the completion time of a spot job depends on the arrival rate of the jobs of higher bids, which is usually uncertain in reality. This incurs the volatility of jobs' completion times and even delay-tolerant users can become reluctant to accept such service. As discussed in Section 2.1, using the model of this article, delay-tolerant jobs can first bid to use spot instances in some period and then turn to stable on-demand instances, leading to completion of jobs the expected amount of time. The numerical comparison of revenue should be taken under the same input condition. In [11] , once a spot job submits the bid, it cannot cancel its bid until it gets a specific amount of execution time; its payment relies on its completion time and waiting cost. In our framework, a spot user can stop bidding at any latter slot after it begins bidding; the payment at a slot is the minimum price of all accepted bids, with no connection to the job's waiting cost and completion time. The CSP's revenue is the price times the processed workload. To enable comparison, we let the average spot prices in both frameworks be the same. Specifically, we let the on-demand price be 1; the generated revenue is 0.5 when a spot instance dedicates an hour to a job. As before, we use the PTC policy to assign jobs to servers.
In [11] , we set n = 1 and the waiting costs of jobs are uniformly distributed on {0.3, 0.7}. The job arrivals follow a Poisson distribution, with expectations λ o in the on-demand market and λ s in the spot market. Fixing λ o = 30, we consider three cases with λ s = 30, 60, and 120, respectively. The sizes of jobs are set as described in Section 6.1.3. Jobs of the spot market have to be finished within bounded periods. We let jobs with c = 0.7 have a waiting time ≤ 48 slots (i.e., 4 hours) and let jobs with c = 0.3 have a waiting time ≤ 132 slots (i.e., 11 hours). The value of m S is the minimum amount of servers needed to guarantee the QoS, i.e., the spot market is fully saturated with as many jobs as possible; the QoS is guaranteed at the 99th percentile as described in Section 6.1.1. The total number of servers is m = m o + m s . We compute the average numbers of servers used per slot in on-demand and spot markets, denoted by m o and m s ; the average unit revenue of both markets is (m o + 0.5 · m s ) /12. For comparison, we also compute the average unit revenue achieved under our framework in the case where there are m servers; here, the spot market is also fully saturated with all idle servers of the on-demand market being employed by spot users. We denote byα e the ratio of the average unit revenue of our framework to its counterpart with the framework of [11] ; let α e =α e − 1 denote the revenue improvement when comparing our framework with the one in [11] . We use α (30) e , α (60) e , α (120) e to denote the α e in the case where λ s is 30, 60, and 120, respectively. The experimental results are given in Figure 15 .
CONCLUSION
In a system where on-demand and spot users coexist, on-demand users arrive randomly and have high priority to access servers, while spot users bid to use the time periods unoccupied by ondemand users. A key feature to make such services accessible is that on-demand users can get served within a short time upon arrival, while a spot user can stably use a server (without the interference of on-demand users) for a sufficient amount of time once bidding successfully. In this article, we propose a framework that has such a feature for sharing the time of servers among on-demand and spot users. Under such a framework, specific schemes are proposed to accept and assign the requests of on-demand and spot users to servers and to optimally price spot instances. The framework itself is designed under assumptions that are met in real environments. With a few further mild assumptions, an analysis of the proposed framework is also taken to understand which parameters drive its performance. Extensive simulations show a significant improvement to the revenue as well as the server utilization once an on-demand market is complemented with a spot market. In the case where less bids are available, the revenue improvement is shown to be smaller but still significant compared with a bare on-demand market.
